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Abstract 
Lexical semantics is a notoriously difficult topic, with no consensus yet on the best method 
for categorization. In his famous Twin Earth thought experiment, Putnam (1975) showed extension by 
reference can prevail over assumed definitions: if cats were revealed as robots controlled from Mars 
(and not animals at all), we would likely change our definition of CAT to preserve reference rather 
than realizing cats do not exist. Thus cats cannot be defined as inherently being animals even in 
ordinary circumstances. 
But we need not invoke imaginary possible worlds to investigate the limits of categories. In 
fact, we can observe real world changes in lexical usage patterns that reveal pre-existing bias in 
lexical meaning. For example, Putnam mentions two similar examples of words changing meaning 
following scientific advancement: GOLD and JADE. In the case of GOLD, once methods were 
discovered to distinguish fool’s gold (pyrite) from GOLD, the narrower meaning prevailed. However, 
in the case of JADE, mineral analysis revealed that JADE in fact referred to two distinct minerals, and 
that wider meaning prevailed. We could consider these to be instances of semantic change, but 
another possibility is to view them as tests of the true, original lexical meaning. When circumstances 
change in the world, usage patterns adjust, but at least to some extent, it is the original meaning (or at 
least most salient aspects of that original meaning) that prevails. WHAT IF becomes WHAT NEXT? 
This paper explores the extent to which we can study lexical meaning by observing changes 
in usage. By imagining plausible possible worlds, we may even be able to make predictions about 
future usage. In synchronic usage, even obvious components of definitions may turn out to be 
optional. Consider HUSBAND, defined in the first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (1899) 
as: “a man joined to a woman by marriage. Correlative of WIFE.” Only recently in the OED’s third 
edition (2016) was the entry updated to account for new usage following legalized gay marriage: 
“male partner in a marriage.” This paper considers the OED’s first definition inaccurate: HUSBAND 
has always meant MALE SPOUSE rather than (MALE) SPOUSE OF WOMAN, but recognizing that 
nuance required changes in culture and law because earlier context did not disambiguate the 
definition. Similar lexical meanings are presented from the perspective of changing contexts, 
including a survey of speaker’s judgments to refine assumed definitions, hinting at possible future 
usage and dictionary definitions. 
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1. Introduction 
 What do words mean? That is an extremely difficult question to answer, and most 
advances in research on the topic have been critiques of earlier research introducing 
additional challenges for the problem, and no flawless, comprehensive theory has yet been 
produced. At the same time, humans can easily identify membership in lexical categories, 
despite linguists being as of yet unable to explain how we do it. This paper presents an 
additional complication for the study of lexical meaning, namely by pointing out that what 
we believe words mean, based on their usage, may not actually demonstrate the full picture 
or all nuances of their meaning. Instead, we must also consider how the words would apply in 
different contexts. Therefore, some instances of apparent semantic change are only illusory, 
and in fact a reflection of the established meaning we have known all along. 
 Let us briefly survey several earlier theories of lexical meaning. First, consider 
Necessary & Sufficient Conditions, one of the oldest approaches to word meaning, since 
Aristotle. By identifying a list of properties which are individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient, all members of a category would be included and non-members excluded. For 
example, it would seem trivial to list (at least some of) such conditions for a CAT, but as 
shown in Table 1, almost all apparently obvious properties have exceptions, and constructing 
an effective list is extremely difficult if not impossible. 
 
Proposed conditions Exceptions 
Cats have four legs, 
and cats have tails 
An injured, three-legged or tailless cat is still a cat, 
and many other animals also have four legs and tails 
Cats have fur A hairless cat is still a (non-typical) cat: see Figure 1 
Cats meow A quiet cat is still a cat 
Cats eat meat A vegetarian cat would be unhealthy but still a cat 
Table 1: Some potential Necessary & Sufficient conditions for CAT 
 
 
Figure 1: Sphynx breed cat, lacking fur of typical cats1 
																																																								
1 Dreamstime.com stock image (public domain). 
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 Another approach to define categories is through Prototypes (Rosch 1973, inter alia). 
Imagine an ideal member of a category, and then notice that all members of the category are 
somewhat similar to that prototype. Therefore, a CAT is to a prototypical cat, as in Figure 2.2 
Figure 1 depicts a cat relatively far removed from this prototype, but it is still a member of 
the class. With prototypes, then, the difficulty is shifted to defining the limits of the category, 
while including all potential members, which may differ in different ways. 
 
Figure 2: Hypothetical, ideal cat as a prototype3 
 
 Despite theoretical difficulties, humans can easily identify categorial membership, so 
how do we know these meanings? It is hard for a theory to determine category boundaries, 
yet we naturally do this all the time as speakers. We might ask then whether we really do 
know what words mean, or whether meaning is contained within one’s mental lexicon. In 
fact, famously, Hilary Putnam (1975) argued against individual knowledge as the source for 
the meaning of words and instead emphasized a social, ostensive component of lexical 
meaning. Collectively, we know that a CAT is whatever we point to and say, “That’s a cat!” 
Beyond this distributed, social meaning, an important social component is that we sometimes 
defer to experts (biologists, etc.). Rather than solving the problem of lexical meaning, 
however, Putnam’s contribution actually only compounds the difficulties. For example, 
meaning now appears circularly based on membership rather than any extractable definition. 
We may not as individuals know what words mean, and the boundaries are still difficult to 
determine. However, there are good reasons to accept Putnam’s critique of previous theories. 
 
2. Thought experiments and beyond 
 Putnam (1962, 1975:162-3) asks: What if it turns out that the things we call cats are 
actually robots remotely controlled from Mars? There are two possible responses, either 
rejecting the category, that cats never existed to begin with, or to reinterpret the category: it 
turns out that cats actually are robots. If we accept the latter response (the “cats” still exist 
after all), we must reject the assumption that cats are a kind of animal. Thus no properties 
can be truly inherent in a definition, and our understanding of a category may be incorrect. 
 Putnam proposes extreme hypothetical situations to detect differences in meaning 
irrelevant in real life, or more technically we might say imagining possible worlds where the 
																																																								
2 Note that the prototypes themselves are not merely averages of all members in a class, nor necessarily 
coherent, non-contradictory concepts. Prototypes are, rather than individuals, more like magnetic anchor points 
around which members of the category cluster. For example, we might imagine a prototypical cat with no fur 
color (but still covered in fur) for speakers whose category of CAT do not focus on color of fur, or the prototype 
might have black fur despite various other typical shades of fur being rated as equally close to the prototype. 
3 Clker.com stock image (public domain). 
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terms would have different extensions (cf. Menzel 2013). Especially his Twin Earth thought 
experiment (1973, 1975) provides a context for inquiring about the meaning of words given 
circumstances relevantly different from reality, revealing problems in usage-based traditional 
definitions for categories. But we need no imaginary worlds to observe new contexts to see 
what words really mean. Crucially, intensions remain constant even when extensions shift in 
different possible worlds, and likewise meaning does not change as we explore changing 
reference in the possible worlds introduced by change of usage in the real world. 
 Putnam also discussed two historical examples where our understanding of lexical 
meaning changed due to scientific advancements, with different outcomes. Only after 
advances in chemistry could GOLD be distinguished from fool’s gold (pyrite) by tests 
showing GOLD dissolves in aqua regia. Despite this, it seems reasonable to say that the 
meaning of GOLD has not changed since ancient times. In contrast, chemical analysis has 
shown JADE to actually be either of two distinct minerals, but usage of the term still applies 
to both. Even with Putnam’s strong arguments that our individual lexicons do not necessarily 
contain full knowledge of how to identify these categories (e.g., via scientific tests), and 
despite changes in usage and knowledge, the meanings of GOLD and JADE appear to have 
actually remained constant. One way to mitigate the limitations ascribed to individual 
knowledge is to ask why the outcomes were different in those situations. In fact, individual 
knowledge may still be sufficient: GOLD and JADE  are both valuable, and regardless of 
technical knowledge, speakers know that is due to scarcity. Thus GOLD remained a narrower 
category to exclude more common similar minerals (also due to tradition), while JADE 
maintained its joint reference because that was already established within its known scarcity. 
 Let us consider DIAMONDS, which today can be reproduced in laboratories (by 
putting carbon under intense pressure) but are rejected as “real diamonds”4 by consumers and 
jewelry experts. Why should this be the case? Technically, artificially produced diamonds 
lack the imperfections of natural diamonds and are thus distinguishable by experts. But 
shouldn’t perfect diamonds be better exemplars? The odd outcome is due to the inherent 
understanding of DIAMONDS being scarce and expensive. This means that DIAMOND 
cannot be defined merely as ‘highly compressed carbon (with certain physical properties)’ 
but also a rare, naturally occurring substance found in the Earth, or at least this is what the 
diamond industry wants consumers to continue to believe, and consumers have apparently 
accepted. Perhaps if alchemy had been a success and methods for turning straw to gold were 
discovered, GOLD too would be restricted to the imperfect, naturally occurring variety. 
 We can consider more nuanced scenarios as well, such as the following. Historically, 
artificially producing diamonds was at first very expensive and therefore not a threat to 
scarcity. As that method of production became economical, a conflict in the definition was 
introduced, and that ambiguity had to be resolved. Furthermore, diamonds are much more 
abundant on other planets in the galaxy with different chemical compositions, although it 
would be far too expensive to harvest them with anything resembling modern technology. 
But if it were to become economical, would the extension of DIAMOND narrow to refer only 
to ‘Earth diamonds’ (as also opposed to artificial diamonds) or would the meaning change 
(forgoing scarcity) to permit any such materials to be considered “real diamonds”? 
 Putnam is correct that individuals do not know all of the technical details about 
lexical categories, yet speakers do know the nuances required for productive usage of terms. 
Furthermore, there seems to be general consistency across speakers, even in new contexts. 
This is our first hint that lexical categories may have internal structure, with some properties 
being more salient and important in determining usage in changing circumstances. 
																																																								
4 Of course this is in reference to the common usage of the term DIAMOND, while in technical contexts the 
term may apply equally to artificially created diamonds as well, such as for manufacturing tools or technology. 
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3. Shifting usage, same meaning 
 Even apparently fundamental components of lexical meanings may turn out to be 
incorrect. In 1899, the first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary defined HUSBAND as: 
“a man joined to a woman by marriage. Correlative of WIFE.” Only last year, in the online 
3rd edition (2016) did the OED update that definition due to changes in contemporary usage: 
“male partner in a marriage.” But the OED’s new definition only reflects a change in usage. 
The original definition is, and has always been, incorrect!5 
 The new context of legalized gay marriage works like a hypothetical thought 
experiment: What if men could marry other men, and women could marry other women? 
What would they be called? Marriage as a social practice has changed. But the meanings of 
HUSBAND and WIFE have not. There has not even been a debate; even though various 
homophobic/sexist expressions like “Who wears the pants in that relationship?” or “He’s a 
sissy!”, it has not become conventional to insult gay marriage by calling married men 
“wives” (or women “husbands”), despite homophobic/sexist expressions being applied to gay 
individuals. Therefore, regardless of political stance and independently of political 
correctness, there is widespread awareness and agreement about the meaning of these terms. 
 The OED’s original definition was contextually appropriate, defining HUSBAND as: 
MALE SPOUSE OF WOMAN. However, the refined definition reveals that it was 
redundant: (MALE SPOUSE) & (SPOUSE OF WOMAN). The ‘new’ definition has in fact 
always been the definition: MALE SPOUSE. It is possible to imagine another language 
where the original meaning really was SPOUSE OF WOMAN, so that two married women 
would be called the same thing as a man married to a woman. But that was obviously never 
the meaning in English. Even in 1899, if a man were to have hypothetically married another 
man, they would have been MALE SPOUSES and therefore HUSBANDS.6 
 
3.1 How meanings change 
 There is a distinction between the meaning of a word and the actual contexts in which 
it is used. This matches the traditional dichotomy between Semantics and Pragmatics (or 
Intension and Extension). Even in frameworks where such distinctions are less important 
(such as Cognitive Linguistics), the contrast is still important to explore for methodological 
reasons. It is difficult to determine when a word has actually changed its meaning, versus a 
new context of usage: consider robot cats from Mars, artificial diamonds, two husbands 
married to each other, and so forth. There are two natural consequences of this observation: 
(1) lexical meanings change less than we might assume; and (2) lexical meanings may be 
different from what we first assume. In fact, even apparently fundamental properties may not 
apply at all (“cats are animals”; “husbands have wives”, etc.). 
 So then when do words actually change meanings? Consider the origin of Indian as 
applied to Native Americans. In the first place, its usage in North America was not a change 
in meaning, but a geographic error. What marked the change in meaning was the continued 
usage of the label after discovering that America was not in fact India. This is also of course 
why the term was sociopolitically inappropriate, indicating indifference to identity. There 
never was a meaning of INDIAN such that anyone in any unknown land could be 
incorporated under that label, so what was first a geographic error became a lexical error, and 
the change in meaning was the conventionalization of that error. Of course some quite 
																																																								
5 In fact, we observed this in the research group in 2015, before the OED was updated, as if we predicted this 
change. Of course other dictionaries had already been updated, and there were social pressures for recognition, 
so we were of course not the first to observe new usage. However, it is our assertion that this is not a change at 
all, but a correction of an error in the first edition, revealed by usage in a new context, not a new meaning. 
6 This should not be surprising at all, because English has no kinship terms based on the gender of the relative 
(‘PARENT OF DAUGHTER’ vs. ‘PARENT OF SON’, etc.) 
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reasonably still consider it to be a lexical error and reject such usage, while others, including 
some Native Americans, have accepted it as a new and distinct label no longer referring to 
people from India. Similar mis-usages and extensions are not uncommon for flora and fauna 
either (e.g., American vs. European ROBIN are distinct birds). In a sense, this zero-
derivation is then parallel to overt modification of terms for new categories such as French 
pomme de terre for ‘potato’ (lit. ‘earth apple’). 
 
3.2 How far usage can shift 
 The ‘motion’ verb GO is a typical example of metaphorical extension and 
grammaticalization, frequently used cross-linguistically beyond the domain of physical 
motion. However, based on the perspective presented here, we might maintain a unified 
analysis of the lexical semantics of GO across several domains. Consider the following 
examples, as discussed in detail in Ross (2016): 
 
(1) The road goes north. (‘fictive motion’) 
(2) We went to see a movie. (physical motion) 
(3) We’re gonna see a movie. (future) 
(4) Look at what he went and did this time! (unexpectedness) 
 
Although at first the meanings of GO in (1-4) appear disconnected, they all share a 
common theme: change in dimension(s) away from the deictic center. The change 
exemplified is not in the core meaning of GO, but in the dimensions which it describes. 
More generally, we might consider metaphorical extensions, as commonly assumed in 
Cognitive Linguistics, to be related to this sense of an unchanged meaning, or to a structured 
meaning, with an unchanged core. Metaphorical extension is the process by which some 
aspect(s) of the meaning of a word are applied to a different domain, such as a movie star 
being STAR-like because they shine (stand out) on screen (and as a celebrity), or even calling 
a badly-behaved child the name of a pet: “Stop it, Rex!” 
Where, then, do we draw the line between inherent properties (as in the Necessary & 
Sufficient Conditions approach) and ubiquitous contextual associations? Would the Prototype 
approach be better for understanding meaning, and would it correctly predict which 
properties speakers will retain or set aside in novel circumstances? Conventionalization also 
of course plays a part as new usages spread through society, but in other cases speakers seem 
to already know what sort of variation in usage would be appropriate. 
Similar to the example of HUSBAND, other words have been shown historically to 
have unexpected interpretations that dictionaries might not predict. The South American 
water-dwelling rodents capybaras (and later beavers) were considered as FISH for religious 
purposes, a decision approved by the Pope in the 16th century. And tomatoes were 
determined to be VEGETABLES (not FRUIT) by the U.S. Supreme Court (Nix v. Hedden 
1893), despite biological classification (cf. Goldman 2013). Therefore, deference to experts, 
as emphasized by Putnam, is at least in some cases less important than conventional usage, 
based on common knowledge. 
 
4. Preliminary survey on lexical meaning 
 Given that the usage of words seem to naturally extend in some ways (but not others), 
can we predict which extensions might occur? Do speakers agree about salient aspects of 
lexical meaning? Consider HUSBAND again: had gay marriage been legalized in 1900, 
almost certainly HUSBAND would have meant MALE SPOUSE (not SPOUSE OF 
WOMAN) as it does now. Are the most salient aspects of lexical meaning part of general 
speaker knowledge? 
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 The following preliminary survey was conducted as part of a project in the Beginning 
Researchers Discussion Group, Spring 2015, at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, and I thank the participants for their involvement (see acknowledgements). 
 The survey was presented online, with 24 questions (2 practice items, 20 core items, 
and 2 fillers), as an explicit judgment task regarding lexical usage. Responses were on a scale 
from 1 (unacceptable) to 5 (acceptable), based on the specific word in context. The items 
were presented in pseudo-random order with counterbalancing across subjects, and most 
items were presented in near-minimal pairs (not adjacent in the order). 91 English speakers 
completed the survey, which was approved by the UIUC Institutional Review Board. 
 For all items, the variance was high (1-5 range for every sentence, including practice 
items and fillers). The results may be biased by number of questions answered and patterns in 
questions, as well as the low number of fillers. Still, we found some interesting patterns that 
suggest this line of research is worth exploring. The mean scores and statistical significance 





During finals week, some students are busy and can only take a nap 
every night from 2am-4am. [3.7/5] 
Mark works the night shift as a security guard, and he usually takes 
a nap from 10am-8pm because of his schedule [2.2/5]  
 
Figure 3: NAP survey results 
 
 This result is statistically significant (p<0.0001, t-test). We can conclude that NAPS 
are short. Compare the OED: “a short or light sleep, esp. one taken during the day.” This 
definition is pragmatically-based and redundant in normal contexts but contradictory in 
atypical contexts, much like the earlier one for HUSBAND. For NAP, the salient feature to 
English speakers is shortness, not time of day. 
 
Mealtimes 
 Similarly, mealtimes are redundantly defined by both their sequence (or purpose), and 
also the typical time of day when they occur. Consider the following OED definitions: 
 
BREAKFAST: “That with which a person breaks his fast in the 
morning; the first meal of the day.” 
DINNER: “The chief meal of the day, eaten originally, and still by 
the majority of people, about the middle of the day, but now, by 









LUNCH: “A synonym of luncheon … Also: a light meal at any time 
of the day.” 
Luncheon: “Originally, a slight repast taken between two of the ordinary 
meal-times, esp. between breakfast and mid-day dinner…; with those who 
‘dine’ in the evening, luncheon denotes a meal (understood to be less 
substantial and less ceremonious than dinner) taken usually in the early 
afternoon.” 
 
 As these OED definitions refer to traditional (and especially British) usage of the 
terms, we can simplify the content (and adjust for our American survey respondents) to 
defining BREAKFAST as FIRST & MORNING, LUNCH as MIDDLE & AFTERNOON, 
and DINNER as LAST & EVENING. We would generally expect these meals to pattern 
together in any changes in usage, especially when a prototypical day consists of three meals 
at different times, known by these names. However, the results are surprising in this regard 
and suggest that the symmetry of these meals is only contextual based on a typical schedule. 
 
BREAKFAST 
Joe works the night shift as a security guard, and he eats breakfast 
when he gets home at 7am. [4.3/5] 
Rob works the night shift as a security guard, and he eats breakfast 
when he wakes up at 8pm. [3.5/5] 
LUNCH 
Mary works the night shift as a security guard, and she eats lunch 
during her break at 3am. [3.8/5] 
Beth works the night shift as a security guard, and she eats lunch 
when she wakes up at 2pm. [3.6/5] 
DINNER 
Sam works the night shift as a security guard, and he eats dinner 
when he gets home at 7am. [3.4/5] 
Bill works the night shift as a security guard, and he eats dinner 
when he wakes up at 8pm. [3.6/5] 
 
 The result show divergent acceptability for BREAKFAST, with IN-THE-MORNING 
more central than FIRST-MEAL-OF-THE-DAY, and this is statistically significant. The 
contrasts for LUNCH and DINNER are not statistically significant, suggesting that these 
categories may be more strongly associated with both order and time of day, although of 
course usage of all three terms would vary based on social context (if others are eating the 
meal at the typical time) and the type of food served. In general, however, it appears that the 
English vocabulary for mealtimes does not naturally shift to reversed schedules, even though 
in normal usage, in typical circumstances, it appears symmetrical and logical. For example, 
there is no term that easily fits for a meal in the middle of the night, even if functioning as a 
typical lunch, and a third meal eaten in the morning after a night shift might be potentially 
called either BREAKFAST or DINNER. Despite its etymology and being associated with 
specific foods, BREAKFAST is the most likely candidate for a possible shift in usage in the 
future, to a morning meal, regardless of schedule, and a nocturnal schedule would require a 
change in meaning to still have three meals in sequence. 
 We can also look at particular words that seem to have changed their meanings in 
contemporary usage, to try to identify the extent and way in which they have changed. Two 
examples from the survey are discussed here. Usage of PREDICT is not always limited to the 
future: it is sometimes found in reference to the past, but when? TYPO is not always limited 
to keyboarding errors, sometimes referring to orthographic errors in general, but when? 
	 9 
PREDICT 
Scientists predicted that Egyptians were buried in pyramids, and 
then an explorer found the first mummy and confirmed this. 
[3.8/5] 
The detective predicted that his brother-in-law was the murderer, 
and the judge agreed that the evidence supported this 
conclusion. [3.0/5] 
 
 A meaning of PREDICT as ‘hypothesize (then test)’ is statistically significantly 
(p<0.001) more acceptable than generally ‘know the past’. The etymology of predict helps to 
explain this: Latin prae- ‘before’ + dicere ‘tell’. The OED defines PREDICT as “To state or 
estimate, esp. on the basis of knowledge or reasoning, that (an action, event, etc.) will 
happen in the future or will be a consequence of something; to forecast, foretell, prophesy.” 
This description generally applies, without the restriction to a future event, and more 
accurately to future knowledge. 
 
TYPO 
Ancient manuscripts often contain typos because they were hand-
copied by monks who did not always have literary training. 
[3.0/5] 
Optical Character Recognition software automatically converts 
scanned images to text, but the results often contain typos due to 
imperfect algorithms. [4.3/5] 
 
 The etymology of typo is ‘typographical error’ in the late 1800s, but today TYPO has 
apparently extended to technology in general but not other human orthographic errors,7 and 
this difference is statistically significant (p<0.0001). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 This exploratory discussion leaves us with more questions than answers. However, 
we can conclude that we must be careful when making assumptions about what words mean 
based on their usage in context, or when claiming that meanings have changed when contexts 
have also changed. The preliminary survey results suggest we can observe changes in 
progress, or to a limited extent even predict potential future changes in usage. Context-based 
usage changes can be observed in the real world, as if imagining extension shifts in possible 
worlds. We are not limited to thought experiments in exploring the real meaning of words. 
From a theoretical perspective, meanings appear to be structured. Either some 
properties are more important than others, or we commonly use false heuristics, despite 
knowing lexical meanings. Having structured meanings also seems relevant for 
understanding the process of metaphorical extension in general. These results suggest some 
validity to the idea of the feature-based approach of Necessary & Sufficient Conditions, 
although with more structure. Despite their advantages as identified in previous literature, 
Prototypes then are unlikely to be entirely abstract, but instead have structure including 
specific features that are more salient than others. These observations may be one step in the 
right direction toward solving some of Putnam’s objections to individual lexical competence 
in favor of socially determined meaning: if lexical meanings are sufficiently general, we can 
know them despite deferring to experts for specific technical tests. Regardless, speakers 
easily know an impressive amount about lexical meaning, and theory has yet to catch up. 
																																																								
7 However, I have observed rare usage in reference to handwriting, so there may be a further change in progress.   
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